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Abstract 
Within a strategic delegation model, this paper examines in a quantity setting oligopoly framework the determinants of 
the degree of strategic delegation - the latter being defined as the extent of the departure from pure profit 
maximization. The sub-game perfect equilibrium degree of strategic delegation is derived as a function of the two key 
parameters which determine market competitiveness in a homogeneous product set-up, i.e., the price-elasticity of 
market demand and the number of firms. With respect to both these parameters we find that their relationship with the 
degree of delegation is not necessarily monotone. Indeed, for an increase in elasticity or a reduction in market 
concentration to reduce strategic delegation, these determinants of the Lerner index of monopoly power must satisfy 
restrictions which guarantee that the initial market environment is sufficiently competitive.
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     1. Introduction
The literature on strategic delegation has shown that prot maximizing rms may strategi-
cally choose to commit to a non-prot maximizing behaviour, the latter being formalized in
terms of each rm's owner delegating market decisions to a manager, to whom an objective
function is assigned in terms of a combination of prots and another variable (revenues,
quantity, relative prots, etc.). The relative weight of this additional variable, strategically
chosen by the owners, is a measure of the distortion from the prot-maximization procedure
to which they commit, and denes the implicit structure of incentives which should support
the underlying principal-agent relation.
In recent years the basic models by Sklivas (1987), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and
Basu (1995) have been enriched to investigate the implications of extending the delegation
(originally conceived for the choice of quantity or price) to decisions concerning, among
others, quality (Ishibashi, 2001), R&D investments (Zhang and Zhang, 1997), vertical and
horizontal product dierentiation (Barros and Grilo, 2002; B arcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga,
2005); moreover, a number of issues such as the protability of horizontal mergers (Gonzalez-
Maestre and Lopez-Cunat, 2001), the sustainability of collusive agreements (Lambertini and
Trombetta, 2002), the competition between private and public rms (White, 2001) have
been re-examined in a delegation framework. Less attention has been paid, however, to
what determines the \degree of delegation", i.e., the extent of the departure from prot
maximization to which rms commit themselves in equilibrium.
In this paper we tackle this issue in a quantity setting framework, and by assuming that
the managers' objective function is a combination of prots and revenues. In particular,
we concentrate on market competitiveness - synthesized in the Cournot equilibrium value
of the Lerner index of monopoly power - as key determinant of the degree of delegation.
By developing a model with constant-elasticity market demand, we parametrize the solution
for the optimal degree of delegation to the elasticity itself and the number of rms, which
is treated as exogenous. Our main result is that the relation between delegation and these
two parameters is not necessarily monotone, allowing for a reduction of the Lerner index of
monopoly power to be associated to a higher delegation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model, discussing in Section
3 the role of demand elasticity and market concentration on the delegation decisions; Section
4 oers some conclusions.
2. The model
We consider a standard two-stage strategic delegation game in a quantity setting framework,
with n oligopolistic rms producing a homogeneous product. Each rm has an owner and a
manager. In this game, the quantity of each rm is set at the second stage by its manager
who maximizes a linear combination of prots and revenues (Fershtman and Judd, 1987).
For each rm, the weight of revenues in the objective function of the manager is the strategic
decision left to the prot maximizing owner at the rst stage. This decision can be thought
1of as the content of a delegation contract and denes the structure of the incentives to the
manager.
In order to parametrize the solution of the game to both the price elasticity of demand
and the number of rms, we assume a market demand function with constant price-elasticity:
P (Q) = Q
  1




The restriction on " ensures that the reaction function of any rm is well dened for any
possible choice of its rivals. All rms share the same technology, synthesized in a constant
average and marginal cost c.
At the quantity stage, the manager of rm i behaves consistently with the incentive
structure chosen by the owner, by maximizing the following linear combination of prots i
and revenues Ri:







qi   icqi, (1)
where the absolute value of the weight attached to revenues (the distance of i from 1) is
a measure of the distortion from pure prot maximization and therefore of the extent of
delegation.





"   ic" = 0; i = 1;:::;n (2)
if (2) is satised for qi > 0, or qi = 0 otherwise. Let us start by considering quantity-stage
equilibria in which all rms produce a positive quantity. In this case, by summing (2) over










































A; i = 1;:::;n.
Notice that for all i, the condition q
i > 0 is satised if i < ("=("(n   1)   1)), where
 =
P
j6=i j. This amounts to saying that a second stage equilibrium with positive quantities
is dened only for a subset of the conceivable  n-tuples; in particular for those n-tuples
which ensure that the extent of delegation is not too dierent across rms. Moreover, when
2i = 1 for all i, i.e., in the absence of strategic delegation, the above expression clearly
collapses to the symmetric Cournot-Nash solution under constant elasticity of demand.
The structure of incentives - i.e., the delegation parameters - are strategically chosen by
the prot-maximizing owners at the rst stage of the game. In order to identify the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium of the model, we shall proceed as follows. We rst look for a
constrained Nash equilibrium in s, i.e., an equilibrium over the restricted domain of the 's
n-tuples delivering positive quantities. Then we prove that this constrained Nash equilibrium
is indeed an unconstrained sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium over the
s unrestricted domain.
By substituting P and q
i in the prot function i = (P   c)qi, and maximizing the latter




i (n"   1)
( + i)

  ("( + i)   (n"   1))
"2 ( + i) + (n"   1)(   "i)
( + i)
2 = 0. (3)
Under symmetry,  = (n   1)i; therefore, under the hypothesis of positive production by
all rms, we obtain the following Nash equilibrium value of the delegation parameter:1

 (";n) =
"2n(n2   n + 1)   (2n"   1)(n   1)   "
"n("   n + n"(n   1))
. (4)
It can be checked that 0 <  < 1. The constant elasticity hypothesis does not alter the
basic feature of strategic substitutability at the quantity stage equilibrium, and this implies
that at the delegation stage the owners are willing to induce strategically an aggressive
behaviour of their managers.
For (4) to be an unconstrained sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the delegation game,
it must be \deviation-proof" over the entire domain of the s. In the Appendix we show that
any unilateral deviation from (4) aimed at inducing the rivals to produce a zero quantity is
not advantageous, so that (4) is indeed a perfect equilibrium over the unrestricted domain
of the strategy space.
3. Demand elasticity, concentration and managerial incentives
A nice feature of (4) is that the sub-game perfect equilibrium degree of strategic delegation
is a function of the two key parameters that dene market competitiveness in a homogeneous
product set-up, i.e., the elasticity of market demand and the number of rms.
We consider rst the role of demand elasticity. It is immediate to check that as " ap-
proaches innity, the incentive to strategic delegation disappears for all values of n. However,
the pattern of convergence to strict prot maximization is not necessarily monotone. Figure
1 shows the behaviour of  (";n) as a function of ", for dierent given values of n:
1It can be checked that the Second Order Conditions for a maximum are satised at this symmetric
equilibrium.
3Figure 1: The pattern of delegation and demand elasticity








of strategic delegation (1   ) is increasing in ", moving from zero (in the limit case " ! 1)
to 0:067, while it is monotonically decreasing for " > 1 +
p
3
3 . For n  3, however, the
 function is monotone: any increase in the elasticity of demand leads to a reduction in
the optimal delegation. In order to explain the non-monotonicity in the duopoly case, it
is useful to concentrate upon the way in which the constant-elasticity hypothesis aects
the reaction function at the two stages of the game. This hypothesis implies that both at
the quantity stage and at the delegation stage the reaction functions exhibit rst strategic
complementarity and then strategic substitutability, the latter characterizing the equilibrium
at both stages.2 At the quantity stage, for positive quantities this shape results from the
interplay of two forces: as the rival rm increases its quantity, rm i experiences both a
leftward shift and a attening of its residual demand curve. While the rst eect lowers
the marginal revenue, the second, which dominates for high values of the rm's quantity
compared to the rival's, tends to increase it. The behaviour of the reaction function directly
derives from these changes in the marginal revenue function (Naish, 1998).
As far as the delegation stage is concerned, Figure 2 shows the reaction function of rm
i at this stage for dierent values of ". The positive quantity restriction (i < j"=("   1))
implies that for any given ", equation (3) - in the gure represented by the solid lines -
2When " = 1, the symmetric equilibrium of the quantity game occurs at a point where the slope of the
reaction function is zero. This strategic independence implies that there is no incentive to distort from prot
maximization the manager's choice. This explains why lim"!1  (";2) = 1.
4Figure 2: The reaction function at the delegation stage
applies for j > j (") = ("   1)=".3. Straightforward calculations show that the reaction
function is rst positively, then negatively sloped, reaching a maximum at the left of the
symmetric equilibrium, the latter being therefore characterized by strategic substitutability.
The intuition behind this slope reversal can be put as follows. As the rival moves towards
prot maximization (higher j), rm i perceives a movement along the market demand curve
with a decrease in Q and an increase in P. This exerts an eect on the delegation choice of
rm i which again is twofold. A lower delegation (higher i) and the related reduction in qi
(a) has a greater upward impact on market price; (b) implies a greater reduction of rm i's
revenues at the given price. The second eect is the only relevant one in the standard linear
demand case and explains in that setup the negative slope of the reaction function over its
entire domain. However, the rst is peculiar of the convex shape of the demand curve in
the constant-elasticity case, and induces strategic complementarity. The standard quantity
eect (and thus strategic substitutability) prevails when the price is suciently high, and
therefore when the quantity produced by the rival is low, due to a low degree of strategic
delegation.
Figure 2 shows also the eects of changes in ". First, notice that as " increases, the
limit value of the domain of the reaction function j shifts to the right: as the market
environment becomes more competitive due to higher ", rm i nds it protable to produce
only in the presence of a progressively less aggressive behaviour by rm j. Moreover, since
higher values of the elasticity of demand imply, ceteris paribus, a lower market price and
a lower reactiveness of price to quantity changes, as " rises the strength of the eects of
3For j < j ("), the best reply of rm i is given by a reaction correspondence: all i  j"=("   1) (in
Figure 2, all points on the dashed lines, or above) represent the best reply of rm i, all entailing qi = 0.
Notice also that for all ", along the reaction function i tends to 1 as j tends to j (")
5the rival's choices described above weakens, and therefore (a) the reaction function attens,
and (b) the dominance of strategic substitutability occurs for progressively lower values of
delegation. When the elasticity is close to one both these movements are consistent with an
inward shift of the part of the reaction function lying above the 45 line; on the contrary, when
the elasticity is higher, as " increases the new reaction function crosses the previous one from
below, at the left of the 45 line. In the rst case the equilibrium degree of strategic delegation
increases, in the second it decreases. Since the optimal delegation is monotonically decreasing
in " for n > 2, the above argument suggests that an inverse relation between elasticity and
delegation occurs, provided that the Lerner index of monopoly power is suciently low, due
to either a suciently low market concentration (n > 2) or a suciently high elasticity of
demand (" > 1 +
p
3=3).
Finally, we consider how strategic delegation is aected by market concentration. The
fact that both the monopolistic and the competitive rm do not provide to their managers
any incentive to depart from prot maximization led Fersthman and Judd (1987) to suggest
that \the relationship between market structure and managerial incentives will likely not
be monotonic", since \nonprot-maximizing incentives will be given only in oligopolistic
industries". Indeed, our constant-elasticity model allows to extend their argument within
the oligopolistic markets. According to (4), for any value of " the optimal degree of delegation
is not monotonically decreasing in n, but reaches its maximum (under the integer constraint)
for n = 3. Again, for any given ", in order to obtain the \intuitive" inverse relation between
delegation and market concentration, the latter must be suciently low.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we investigated the determinants of the degree of strategic delegation in a quan-
tity setting framework. The ideal setup to study how market fundamentals aect strategic
delegation would be one which allows to parametrize the solution with respect to the elas-
ticity of market demand, the elasticity of costs and the number of rms. However, under
generic constant elasticity of demand and generic constant elasticity of costs, the two-stage
game cannot be solved. Therefore, by assuming linear costs we focussed upon the role of
the two factors aecting market competitiveness: the elasticity of demand and the number
of rms.
While one would expect that moving towards a more competitive environment should
reduce the incentive to delegation, our main result is that the relationship between the factors
underlying the Lerner index of monopoly power and the degree of strategic delegation is not
necessarily monotone. On the one side, in a duopoly setting there is a range of demand
elasticity values for which delegation increases with elasticity; on the other side, for all
values of the elasticity the highest degree of strategic delegation is not observed for n = 2,
but for n = 3.
Competition weakens the incentives to commit to an overaggressive behaviour, but for
this to occur the initial environment must be suciently competitive, either in terms of
demand elasticity or in terms of market concentration.
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7Appendix
Solution (4) has been obtained under a \restricted domain" hypothesis, i.e., by concentrating
upon the  n-tuples which entail positive production by all rms. In order to ensure that
it is the unconstrained sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the delegation game, we have
to prove that no rm has the incentive to deviate from (4) choosing a value of  such that
rivals nd it optimal to refrain from production. Here we demonstrate this deviation-proof
property in the duopoly case, but the same procedure can be applied to the general oligopoly
case.
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rm i to produce a zero quantity by setting
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which are negative for " > 1. The same negative prots outcome arises also in the oligopoly
case.4 Solution (4) is therefore an unconstrained sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, since
no rm perceives the incentive to be unilaterally so aggressive to induce the rivals to refrain
from production.
4Detailed calculations are available upon request.
8